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1. Background
Excise duties are one of the traditional sources of tax revenue in Nepal.
In the past these duties used to be levied on agricultural products, liquors
and industrial products2). They are now levied only on a few industrial
products. Excise duties are levied on the domestically manufactured goods
only; imports are kept outside the excise net.
Excise duties are now fourth largest sources of tax revenue of His
Table 1: RelativeImportance of Excise Duties
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1) Dr. Khadka is National Advisor at the VAT Project and a Member of the
Permanent Revenue Advisory Board, Nepal.
2) Revenue contribution of agricultural products, liquor and industrial products
may be seen from Appendix 1.
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Majesty's Government of Nepal (HMG/N). As indicated in Table 1, they
provided about 11 percent of total tax revenue in 1997/98. Their
contribution to the total tax revenue was 5 percent in 1950/51, about 10
percent in 1960/61, 15 percent in 1970/71, 12 percent in 1980/81 and 15
percent in 1990/91.
Excise revenue was 1.05 percent of GDP in 1997/98 compared to 0.81
percent in 1995/96 and 1.05 percent in 1985/86.
In 1997/98, almost half of total excise revenue was collected from
cigarettes. Liquor contributed about 28 percent and beer 19.23 percent.
The items stated so far provided more than 96 percent of total excise
revenue while all other items generated less than 4 percent of total excise
revenue.
Table 2: Composition of Excise Revenue (1977/98)
2. Evolution
Excises were used widely during the Rana3) reign for revenue purposes.
The main sources of excise revenue were liquor, leather, pig-hair, mining,
herbs, hashish and opium. Excise duties levied on opium, ganja and
hashish were known as krishi (agriculture)Rakam and the excise duties
levied on liquor, leather, bones and horns were known as Madabhatti
(alcohol) Rakam, Charsa (leather) Rakam and Had-Sing (bone and horn)
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Rakam respectively^
The year 1854 is noteworthy in the history of excise taxation in Nepal
because some legal provisions were made regarding excise taxation in the
civillaw enacted in that year. Excise duties were administered by Rakam
Bandobasta Adda, which was set up during the reign of King Surendra.
This office had to provide contracts for the collection of tax revenue in
different areas and to collect tax through the contractors. There was no
uniform excise rate for different parts of the country. Contractors levied
different rates mainly on the basis of past experience and the value of the
contract.
Excise duties were levied on liquor and non-industrial products such as
pig hair, leather, hemp and opium until 1957. This tax was extended to
the industrial products with the enactment of the Excise Act 1958. The
Excise Act 1958 was enacted to bring uniformity in the excise system
throughout the country and all existing laws concerning excises applicable
to particular areas were abolished. Excises were levied on sugar and
matches first and then have been extended to different commodities in
different fiscal years. The names of commodities that have been included
in or taken off the excise tariff in different fiscal years are given in
Appendix 2.
Appendix 2 shows the sizable expansion of the coverage of excise
duties during the last four decades. Until the mid-1980s, the coverage of
excise duties was broadened in most of the fiscal year save 1963/64, 1967/
68, 1970/71, 1973/74, 1974/75, 1977/78, 1978/79, 1979/80, and 1982/83.
The fiscal year 1985/86 was the most important in the history of excise
taxation in the sense that the largest number of new commodity (13) was
brought in the excise net in this year. The fiscal year 1984/85 was another
landmark when excises were extended to 12 new items. The fiscal year
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1976/77 was another notable year when excise duties were introduced on
10 new times. Similarly some new items were added in the excise tariffin
some other fiscal years.
On the other hand, some items were dropped from the excise tariffin
some of the fiscal years. For example, tax on cloth was abolished in the
fiscal year 1963/64, on pig-hair in 1970/71 and parkets in 1979/80. On the
whole, until 1985/86, very few items were taken off the excise tarifffor
different reasons whereas many items were added to it. As a result the
number of excisable items reached more than 65 by 1985/86 from 5 in
1961/62.
The reason for such an increase in the coverage of excise duties is that
new items are gradually being produced within the country and they are
brought within the excise net presumably for revenue purposes. Most of
the items added to the excise tariff,however, provided only a nominal
amount of revenue. As stated elsewhere, the bulk of the excise revenue
comes from a limited number of items such as tobacco products and
alcoholic beverages, which have been subject to excise duties since the
early 1960s. So itis open to question whether the extension of commodity
coverage had really served any purpose.
The trend has been reversed since the fiscal year 1986/87 as HMG/N
adopted a policy to take relatively unproductive items off the excise tariff.
Excises on 12 items were abolished in the fiscal year 1986/87. Excise was
abolished on 32 relatively unproductive items in 1993/94, and on 11 items
in 1994/95. Similarly, excise was abolished on several other items in other
fiscal years. In 1999/2000, indicated in Appendix 3, excise duties are
levied on 14 items.
3. Excise Tariff
Specific rates predominated in the excise tariffuntil the early 1980s. In
1961/62, out of a total of 5 excisable commodities, 4 were subject to
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specific rates. Similarly, in 1962/63, 5 items were subject to specific rates
out of 6 excisable commodities. All excisable goods were subject to
specific rates during the period from 1964/65 to 1967/68. More than 95
percent of total excisable items were subject to specific rates until the end
of 1970s.
However, there had been an emphasis on ad valorem rates in the 1980s.
As a result, specific duties were converted into ad valorem rates and the
rates on most of the new commodities brought into the excise net in the
1980s had been fixed on an ad valorem basis. In addition, rates were
fixed both on a specific and an ad valorem basis on some items and
whichever was the higher rate was the effective rate. Further, both specific
and ad valorem rates were levied on almost half of the excisable items in
mid-1980s. The reason behind the fixing of rates on both a specific and
an ad valorem basis was to make the excise system responsive to price
changes and at the same time to safeguard revenue from decreases due to
understatement of the ex-factory price. This has, however, complicated tax
administration. So specific rates were integrated into ad valorem rates
over the years. The policy had changed again in the 1990s when the
emphasis has been on specific rates rather than ad valorem rates due to
administrative reason. Now, as indicated in Appendix 3, all excisable
items except vehicles are subject to specific rates.
The rates of excises on several items have been raised from time to
time. For example, the rates on cigarettes, the largest revenue-generating
item, were raised from 6 paisa5) per thousand sticks in 1961/62 to Rs. 11-
17 in 1971/72.6) These rates were further raised from time to time and by
1999/2000, the minimum rate on 1000 cigarette sticks is raised to Rs. 90
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while the maximum rate is fixed at Rs. 625. Similarly, the rates on several
other items have been stepped up sharply over the years.
4. Administrative procedures
4. 1 Contract System
It is to be noted that excise duties were collected through contractors
until the 1950s. A license for the collection of these duties in a particular
area was generally granted by auction to the highest bidder for a specified
period of time. The reasons behind the introduction of the contract system
were probably that the then rulers did not like to be involved in revenue
administration and wanted to collect the maximum revenue with minimum
efforts. Moreover, effective tax administration was not possible with the
limited number of revenue personnel available. It is also true that the
contract system possessed some advantages, including certainty of fixed
amount of revenue and lower administrative costs of collection.
This system, however, suffered from a number of limitations, including
collection of much more tax revenue from taxpayers than the tax revenue
deposited in the public exchequer, variation in tax collection practices in
different parts of the country, difficult to train a large number of
contractors every year and develop professionalism. The contract system
of collecting excise revenue on ganja and opium in the Terai region was
abolished in 1952 and in its places the license system was introduced7).
Ganja (hemp) and opium were cultivated in the Terai region on a large
scale. Under the license system, excise duties were levied on the basis of
the area of land under cultivation (for example, Rs. 4500 per BighaS)). Land
revenue offices were responsible for providing license, surveying the land
under cultivation and collecting excise revenue. The land had to be
surveyed when the ganja and opium was ready for harvesting. Staffs were
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sent from Gadi, Gauda or Goshwara offices as witnesses, while the land
was surveyed for excies purposes. If the extent of cultivation of ganja and
opium was found to be more than five percent of the permitted extent it
was considered an illegal activity. In such an event, legal action was
instituted in the court against the cultivator. One fourth of revenue had to
be paid at the time the license was given and the balance after the land
was surveyed9).
The system of collection of excises on ganja and opium in hilly areas
was different from that in Terai. In the hilly region ganja and opium
were not cultivated as in Terai, but they grew naturally. Local people
used to collect ganja and hashish on a small scale and sell them to local
businessmen who in turn sold the commodities to bigger businessmen.
Since excises were collected under the contract system the contractors
used to collect excise revenue from these businessmen at different points
when these businessmen returned from the hilly areas after buying the
ganja and hashish. There were no specified excise rates. Contractors used
to levy excises on the basis of past experience and the value of contract10).
Excises on these items were abolished in 1973/74n) while excises on pig-
hair and leather had already been abolished in 1970/7112).
In the case of liquor, the contract system continued until 1995/96. Until
1969 there were a limited number of businessmen involved in liquor
contract. Since it was difficult to control and regulate a large number of
small businessmen, the practice was to provide contracts to big
businessmen who happened to be the highest bidder at the time of auction.
Such contractors had been given exclusive rights of production and
distribution of liquor. Under this system there was no competition since
－129－
small businessmen were unable to participate in the bidding. This resulted
in a considerable loss of excise revenue.
Hence, HMG/N introduced the Katkendari system for collecting excise
revenue in 1970/7113). This system was also a variant of the contract
system. Under this system, larger areas that existed earlier were divided
into smaller areas and the value of contract was naturally lowered. Thus
under this system even smaller businessmen were capable of participating
in the auction, resulting in greater competition and higher amounts of
excise revenue. This is borne out by the fact that excise revenue from
liquor contracts was Rs. 17 million in 1970/71 against Rs. 9 million in
1969/70. Thus the new system proved to be more productive. However, it
failed to attractreliable contractors in some districts.Moreover, it was not
possible to exercise minimum control over either the quantity produced or
the quality of liquor produced by such a large number of small contractors.
Because of this problem, HMG/N adopted a policy of replacing the
contract system by the minimum guarantee distillery system in 1976.
Under this system tenders were invited for the production and distribution
of liquor for a particular area. Tender suppliers had to specify the
minimum amount that had to be paid as excise during a fiscal year.
Generally the highest tender supplier was given an exclusive right to
produce and distributeliquor for a particular area. He might be given this
right so long as HMG/N was satisfied with performance. But HMG/N
could raise the minimum guarantee amount after consultation with the
supplier (distillery).
Under this system, excise inspectors used to be posted at the distillery
for supervision. Liquor was removed only with the prior permission of the
excise inspector and excise was levied on removed liquor. But if the
amount of tax thus paid was less than the minimum amount at the end of
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the fiscal year, the distillery had to pay the balance irrespective of
production. On the other hand, if the amount of tax thus paid was higher
than the minimum amount, it was not refunded to the distillery.The
underlying objective behind this system was to exercise greater control
over the production and quality of liquor.
Different system of levying excise duties on liquor (such as contract
system, minimum guarantee system and normal excise system) created distortion
and inconsistency in the excise system. So both the contract and the
minimum guarantee system were abolished in 1966/67 when industrial
license was given to the contractors of low quality liquor.
4. 2 Physical control system
Excise duties are run under the physical control system. Under this
system, a manufacturer is required to obtain a licence, to be renewed
annually, for the manufacture of excisable items and has to obtain
permission from the excise officer concerned for the commencement of
manufacturing. When production begins, the manufacturer has to send
samples of his products to the Value Added Tax Department (then Excise
Department) to have them certified by the excise officer, and, in the event
of any change in such goods, he has to send samples of such as well. An
excise inspector is posted at his factory for excise purposes. The
manufacturer has to keep raw materials, semi-processed and manufactured
goods under the supervision of the excise inspector. These goods cannot
be removed from the factory premises without the prior approval of excise
inspector and payment of duties.
The manufacturer is required to send to the department concerned
monthly and annual returns showing production, sales, amount of excise
tax paid, stock etc., after having them certified by the excise inspector
posted at the factory. He is required to obtain prior approval from this
officialin order to remove his goods from the factory warehouse.
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The physical control system has not been effective at controlling
leakage in excise revenue. This is because the excise inspectors stationed
at factories are generally low level employees who do not have adequate
education and training, and are unable to maintain a proper control of
production and sales. Further, as one inspector might have to supervise
more than one factory it is not possible to be at each factory all the time.
Any attempt to post one inspector at each factory (including small factories)
would escalate the cost of collection. The system is expensive not only in
terms of administration but in terms of compliance costs for the
manufacturers as well. This is because a manufacturer has to provide
accommodation for the excise inspector. The inspector may even harass
the manufacturer, particularly small manufacturers. Moreover, the presence
of an excise inspector at the factory creates inconvenience to the
manufacturer. On the other hand, collusion between manufacturers and
excise officialsis believed to have been considerable.
4. 3 Self Removal System
The physical control system became less relevant in the late 1980s and
early 1990s due to the conversion of most of the excise rates from
specific to ad valorem rates. Under the ad valorem regime, a proper
check of the records and the fixing of ex-factory prices are more
important than the physical checks.
In this context, in 1991/92 a self-removal procedure was introduced on
an experimental basis in place of the physical control system.14) Under this
system, a manufacturer wishing to adopt the self-removal procedure has to
apply to the excise office concerned in the prescribed way. If approval is
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given, the manufacturer has to keep account of raw materials, semi-
processed goods, finished goods, and goods removed from his warehouses
in a prescribed manner. He can then assess excise himself, collect it from
the customers and remove goods without the prior permission of excise
officials.He is, however, required to furnish information about the ex-
factory price of his goods to the chief of the excise office at least 3 days
before effecting any removal.
The new system is less expensive than its predecessor is, as excise
officials are not posted at factories. Under this new system, great trust is
placed upon the manufacturers. Despite the integrity of the manufacturers,
an effective system of monitoring is still highly essential to make the
system successful. This system has not been adopted by the manufactures,
who do not want to be responsible for all excise formalities. So the serf-
removal system remained only in paper.
5. Issues and scope
The international experience indicates that excise duties remain
important sources of revenue even in the modern tax system. For example,
these duties provide substantial amount of revenue in the European
Communities. They are levied to generate revenue as well as to achieve
some socio-economic objectives. These taxes are generally levied on
tobacco products, alcoholic beverages, and some luxury goods such as
vehicles and petroleum products. These duties will remain important in
Nepal as well.
Excise duties are currently levied only on domestic products; keeping
imports outside the excise net. There is a countervailing duty on import
which is equivalent to excise duties on domestic product. Countervailing
duties are levied under the Finance Act of each year; they lack procedural
law. Besides, countervailing duties can be levied only on those types of
imported goods if similar products are produced domestically and are
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subject to excise duties. There may be a case to levy excise on some
imported items even if such items are not produced domestically. It is,
therefore, necessary to levy excise duties both at the point of manufacture
and of import. Excise duties should be extended to some more luxuries
items, but not on unproductive items
The existing excise tax system has an anti-export bias. Inputs are taxed
under the existing excise system. Legal provisions relating to the refund
of taxes levied on inputs of exports have not been implemented due to the
lack of simple and well-functioning excise refund systems. The provisions
to exempt excise on items meant for export is not easy or there is no
provision at all to exempt export from excise duties All these factors
make domestic products less competitive in the international market. It is
necessary to develop and implement such a system that relieves exports
from the burden of excise duties.
Excise duties are also cumulative. Although under the existing excise
system, goods produced by a domestic industry which are produced with
domestic raw materials and used by another domestic industry as inputs
are exempt from excise on the recommendation of the department
concerned, in fact this hardly followed in practice, resulting only in excise
on excise. This leads to tax cascading. Attempt must be made to relieve
inputs of excisable products from burden of excise duties.
There is also a problem of the illicitproduction of liquor. This leads
not only to reduction in tax revenue but the liquor produced in this way
may be substandard that will have negative impact on the consumers of
such products. While the government has been levying liquor control fees
in order to use its proceeds to control the illicitliquor production, it has
not been effective. It is, therefore, necessary to adopt effective measures
to control illicitproduction of liquor.
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